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ABSTRACT	
	
Background:	 Disorders	 of	 consciousness	 (DOC)	 result	 from	 focal	 or	 extensive	 brain	lesions.	Patients	 suffering	 from	DOC	go	 through	neurobehavioral	 assessments	 and	are	classified	 in	 different	 categories:	 coma,	 unresponsive	 wakefulness	 syndrome	 (UWS)	(also	 known	 as	 vegetative	 state)	 and	 minimally	 conscious	 state	 (MCS).	 Recently,	 the	broader	 use	 of	 technologies,	 such	 as	 functional	 neuroimaging	 and	electroencephalography,	has	allowed	the	highlighting	of	preserved	cognitive	capacities	in	patients	behaviourally	categorized	as	UWS	or	MCS.	Such	condition	is	called	cognitive	motor	dissociation	(CMD).		
Objectives:	 1)	 To	 investigate	 the	 consciousness/functional	 recovery	 in	 patients	 with	disorders	 of	 consciousness	 (DOC)	 as	 well	 as	 those	 presenting	 with	 cognitive	 motor	dissociation	 (CMD),	 2)	 to	 compare	 the	 different	 functional	 outcomes	 to	 see	 whether	those	with	preserved	cognitive	capacities	differ	and	3)	to	evaluate	the	patients’	clinical	evolution	between	admission	and	discharge.		
Method:	 We	 retrospectively	 included	 141	 patients	 admitted	 to	 the	 Acute	 Neuro-rehabilitation	 Unit	 (NRA)	 of	 the	 University	 Hospital	 of	 Lausanne	 (CHUV,	 Lausanne,	Switzerland)	 from	 November	 2011	 to	 August	 2018	 and	 investigated	 their	 functional	outcomes	 at	 admission	 and	 discharge	 using	 6	 different	 outcome	 scales.	 Univariate	analyses	were	then	performed	to	compare	the	different	functional	outcomes.		
Results:	 Patients	 presenting	 with	 CMD	 were	 significantly	 associated	 with	 better	functional	outcomes	and	potential	of	improvement	than	the	patients	suffering	from	DOC.		
Conclusion:	 Our	 findings	 support	 the	 fact	 that	 CMD	 patients	 constitute	 a	 separate	category	 of	 patients	with	different	 potential	 of	 improvement	 and	 functional	 outcomes	than	patients	suffering	from	DOC.	This	reinforces	the	need	for	them	to	be	recognized	as	soon	as	possible,	as	it	could	have	a	direct	impact	on	patient	care	and	influence	life	and	death	decisions.			
KEYWORDS	
	Disorders	 of	 consciousness;	 cognitive	motor	 dissociation;	 covert	 cognition;	 functional	outcomes;	early	rehabilitation				
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INTRODUCTION		Consciousness	 is	 very	 often	 a	 difficult	 concept	 to	 explain,	 as	 it	 has	 more	 to	 do	 with	something	 experienced	 than	 described.	 According	 to	 James	 (1),	 “at	 its	 least,	 normal	human	 consciousness	 consists	 of	 a	 serially	 time-ordered,	 organized,	 restricted	 and	reflective	awareness	of	self	and	the	environment.	Moreover,	it	is	an	experience	of	graded	complexity	and	quantity.”	For	Plum	and	Posner	(2),	“Consciousness	means	awareness	of	self	and	environment”.	Furthermore,	it	can	be	defined	as	the	ability	to	self-report.	Being	conscious	 is	 therefore	 a	 personal	 and	 internal	 process	 of	 recognising	 something	 as	 a	conscious	content	(3-4).			Usually	 described	 as	 a	 bidimensional	 model,	 consciousness	 is	 characterized	 by	 two	major	components:	arousal	and	awareness	(5).		Arousal,	 also	 called	wakefulness,	 refers	 to	 the	 level	 of	 consciousness	 (6).	 It	 goes	 from	deep	dreamless	sleep	to	alert	wakefulness	and	is	controlled	by	the	ascending	reticular	activating	system	(ARAS)	(5).	 	ARAS	 is	a	dense	neuronal	network	originating	 from	the	upper	brainstem	and	projecting	to	the	cortex	via	the	thalamus.	 It	promotes	arousal	by	facilitating	the	passage	of	sensory	information	to	the	brain.		Awareness	 refers	 to	 the	 content	 of	 consciousness	 (6).	 The	 latter	 consists	 of	 an	individual’s	subjective	experience	and	is	influenced	by	many	aspects,	such	as	sensations,	emotions,	thoughts,	imagination	etc.	(5).	In	order	to	have	a	conscious	perception,	stimuli	must	be	transmitted	to	the	primary	cortices,	the	secondary	cortices	(higher-order	areas)	and	 to	 the	 frontoparietal	 network,	 a	 functional	 integrating	 region	 encompassing	polymodal	 associative	 cortices	 and	 connected	 to	 the	 thalamus	 (via	 cortico-thalamo-cortico	pathways)	(7).	For	example,	an	auditory	stimulus	 that	 triggers	an	activation	of	primary	auditory	cortices	won’t	be	consciously	perceived	 if	not	 transmitted	 to	higher-order	 multimodal	 areas	 (secondary	 and	 associative	 cortices)(8).	 Thus,	 cerebral	activation	 limited	 to	 subcortical	 areas	 and	 primary	 cortices	 is	 not	 sufficient	 for	awareness	because	of	its	need	for	higher-order	integration.	
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Figure	1:	Illustration	of	the	two	major	components	of	consciousness:	arousal	(wakefulness)	and	awareness	*	
	
*Taken	from	(9),	originally	adapted	from	(7)	
Disorders	of	consciousness	(DOC)	
	Disorders	 of	 consciousness	 (DOC)	 result	 from	 focal	 or	 extensive	 brain	 lesions	 that,	following	 a	 period	 of	 coma/complete	 loss	 of	 consciousness,	 induce	 an	 alteration	 in	arousal	 and/or	 awareness,	 hence	 preventing	 patients	 to	 interact	 with	 their	environment.	Aetiologies	of	DOC	are	multiple	and	various,	but	can	be	classified	 in	 two	major	 categories:	 traumatic	 versus	 non-traumatic	 brain	 injuries.	 Traumatic	 brain	injuries	 include	 falls,	 acceleration/deceleration	 injuries,	 violence,	 penetrating	 injuries,	etc.	 whereas	 non-traumatic	 injuries	mainly	 consist	 of	 hypoxic	 injuries,	 non-traumatic	haemorrhages,	tumours,	metabolic	disorders,	infectious	diseases	or	toxic	exposure.		The	incidence	of	traumatic	brain	injury	in	the	United	States	is	estimated	to	be	between	180	 and	 250	 per	 100’000	 population	 per	 year	 (10).	 A	 systematic	 review	 in	 Europe	reported	 the	 incidence	 to	 be	 between	 47.3	 and	 846	 per	 100’000	 population	 per	 year	(11).	 In	 Switzerland,	 a	 cohort	 study	 revealed	 an	 incidence	 of	 severe	 traumatic	 brain	injury	 of	 8.2	 per	 100’000	 person-years	 (12).	 Because	 of	 the	 improvement	 in	 the	management	 of	 patients	 suffering	 from	 severe	 brain	 injuries,	 the	 number	 of	 patients	surviving	those	types	of	injuries	has	increased	in	the	recent	years.	According	to	a	study	conducted	by	Siman-Tov	and	al.	(13)	in	all	level	1	trauma	centres	in	Israel,	the	mortality	associated	with	traumatic	brain	injury	has	decreased	from	17%	in	2000	to	11%	in	2010.	However,	approximately	20%	of	the	patients	who	survive	from	a	brain	injury	will	suffer	from	a	disorder	of	consciousness	(14).	
	 6	
Coma	is	an	acute	disorder	of	consciousness	where	the	patients	remain	unresponsive	to	any	 stimulation,	 show	no	 sign	of	 awareness	nor	wakefulness	with	 the	eyes	 constantly	closed	and	a	loss	of	sleep-wake	cycle	(15).		Patients	who	survive	coma	will	usually	evolve	into	a	state	described	as	the	unresponsive	
wakefulness	 syndrome	 (UWS),	 also	 known	 as	 the	 vegetative	 state	 (VS).	 UWS	 patients	show	 signs	 of	wakefulness,	with	 the	 alternation	 of	 eyes	 open	 and	 closed	 as	well	 as	 a	remaining	 pattern	 (although	 pathological)	 of	 sleep-wake	 cycles.	 However,	 they	 stay	unresponsive.	 Indeed,	 no	 behavioural	 awareness	 can	 be	 highlighted	 in	 such	 patients	(15-16).			The	minimally	conscious	state	(MCS),	a	state	in	which	patients	can	evolve	from	UWS,	 is	characterized	by	 the	presence	of	 different	 levels	 of	 transitory	 awareness.	 Just	 like	 the	UWS	 patients,	 MCS	 patients	 show	 signs	 of	 wakefulness	 but	 they	 also	 demonstrate	inconsistent	 but	 not	 reflexive	 behavioural	 evidence	 of	 self	 or	 environment	 awareness	(17).	 Furthermore,	 Bruno	 and	 al.	 (18)	 proposed	 a	 sub-categorization	 into	 MCS-	 and	MCS+.	 MCS-	 (low-end	 behaviours)	 includes	 visual	 pursuit	 and	 localization	 of	 noxious	stimulation	 whereas	 MCS+	 (high-end	 behaviours)	 includes	 command	 following,	comprehensible	 verbalizations	 and/or	 non-functional	 communication.	 Those	 two	categories	 not	 only	 differ	 in	 term	of	 behaviours,	 they	 also	 show	a	different	 functional	neuroanatomy	(see	below).			
Figure	2:	Clinical	criteria	of	disorders	of	consciousness*	
	
	
	
	
*Taken	from	(18)	
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Table	 1:	 Characteristic	 clinical	 features	 of	 coma,	 unresponsive	 wakefulness	 syndrome	 and	 minimally	
conscious	state*	
		 Coma	 UWS	 MCS	
Wakefulness	 No	sleep-wake	cycles		Eyes	closed		 Intermittent	periods	of	wakefulness	manifested	by	the	presence	of	sleep/	wake	cycles	(i.e.,	periodic	eye	opening)		
Intermittent	periods	of	wakefulness		
Awareness	 No	behavioural	sign	of	self-awareness	or	environmental	awareness		
No	behavioural	sign	of	self-awareness	or	environmental	awareness		
Inconsistent	but	clear-cut	behavioural	signs	of	self-awareness	or	environmental	awareness		
Receptive	language	 None	 None	 Inconsistent	one-step	command	following	gestural	or	verbal	“yes/no”	responses	(regardless	of	accuracy)		
Expressive	language	 None	 None	 Not	spontaneous	and	limited	to	single	words	or	short	phrases,	yet	intelligible		
Visual	perception	 None	 Inconsistent	visual	startle		No	sustained	fixation	nor	pursuit		
Visual	pursuit		Object	recognition		
Motor	function	 Primitive	reflexes	only		 Gradual	resumption	of	spontaneous	or	elicited	movement,	however	always	non-purposeful	or	reflexive		
Purposeful	behaviours	including	movements	or	affective	behaviours	in	contingent	relation	to	relevant	stimuli		Localisation	to	noxious	stimuli	Object	manipulation		Automatic	movement	sequences		
*	Reproduced	from	(9),	originally	adapted	from	(19)	
	
Functional	neuroanatomy	of	UWS	and	MCS	
	Using	 18-fluorodesoxyglucose	 positron	 emission	 tomography,	 Laureys	 and	al.	 (20-21-22)	 described	 the	 central	 role	 of	 the	 frontoparietal	 network’s	 connectivity	 and	 his	thalamic	connections	in	the	maintenance	of	awareness.	Indeed,	UWS	patients	presented	a	significant	dysfunction	in	the	associative	areas	of	the	prefrontal,	premotor	and	parieto-temporal	 cortices	 while	 MCS	 patients	 showed	 only	 a	 partial	 impairment	 of	 those	networks.	 Furthermore,	 disconnections	 between	 the	 primary	 sensory	 areas	 and	 the	higher-order	 associative	 cortices	 have	 been	 highlighted	 in	 UWS	 patients	 (23-24)	whereas	MCS	patients	demonstrate	a	more	elaborated	and	integrated	level	of	processing	(25-26),	thus	supporting	the	importance	of	those	connections	for	conscious	perceptions.	Moreover,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 the	 sub-categorizations	 MCS-	 and	 MCS+	 proposed	 by	Bruno	 and	 al.	 (18)	 demonstrated	 different	 neuroanatomy.	 Indeed,	 MCS-	 showed	 a	preserved	 right	 hemispheric	 cortical	 metabolism	 (more	 likely	 indicating	 residual	sensory	consciousness)	with	 impaired	 left	 cortical	networks,	whereas	MCS+	showed	a	preserved	metabolism	and	functional	connectivity	in	language	networks.	Those	findings	
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join	 the	 results	 of	Rodriguez	Moreno	and	al.	 (27)	 in	 their	 fMRI	 study	 of	DOC	patients	suggesting	that	the	activity	of	the	language	network	could	be	an	indicator	of	higher-level	cognition.		
Cognitive	motor	dissociation	(CMD)		Recently,	 the	 broader	 use	 of	 technologies,	 such	 as	 functional	 neuroimaging	 and	electroencephalography,	 has	 brought	 new	 insights	 into	 the	 understanding	 of	 DOC.	 A	major	 input	was	 the	highlighting	of	preserved	 cognitive	 capacities	 in	patients	with	no	behavioural	 sign.	 Indeed,	 in	 their	 study	 Owen	 and	 al.	 (28)	 gave	 a	 patient,	 clinically	diagnosed	in	VS	five	months	post	injury,	spoken	instructions	to	perform	mental	imagery	tasks	 (playing	 tennis	 and	 visiting	 the	 rooms	 of	 her	 house).	 Her	 neural	 responses	measured	 through	 fMRI	 were	 indistinguishable	 from	 those	 observed	 in	 healthy	volunteers,	demonstrating	her	preserved	ability	 to	understand	spoken	commands	and	respond	to	them	through	her	brain	activity.	This	confirmed	that	despite	her	inability	to	express	 it	 through	 speech	 or	movement,	 the	 patient	was	 consciously	 aware	 of	 herself	and	her	surroundings.	Goldfine	and	al.	(29)	demonstrated	that	awareness	could	also	be	detected	 by	 EEG	 power	 spectral	 analysis	 in	 chronic	 patients	 showing	 no	 behavioural	sign.	 Similar	 results	 were	 found	 by	 Monti	 and	 al.	 (30),	 confirming	 the	 existence	 of	patients	 who	 show	 limited	 or	 no	 sign	 of	 consciousness	 at	 bedside	 but,	 when	 using	functional	 technologies,	prove	 to	have	residual	cognitive	 functions	and	even	conscious	awareness.	Edlow	and	al.	(31)	demonstrated	that	covert	consciousness	can	not	only	be	present	in	patients	suffering	from	chronic	disorders	of	consciousness,	but	it	can	also	be	highlighted	in	patients	during	the	acute	phase	of	a	brain	injury,	hence	the	importance	to	detect	those	patients	already	in	the	intensive	care	units	(ICU).	Schiff	(32)	proposed	the	term	 cognitive	 motor	 dissociation	 (CMD)	 to	 define	 such	 patients.	 The	 underlying	mechanisms	associated	with	this	condition	are	not	fully	understood	yet.	In	the	study	by	Fernandez-Espejo	 and	 al.	 (33),	 CMD	 patients	 demonstrated	 a	 selective	 bilateral	interruption	 in	 the	 white	 matter	 connections	 between	 the	 thalamus	 and	 the	 motor	cortex,	 thus	 inhibiting	 the	 excitatory	 coupling	 necessary	 for	 the	 motor	 execution.	Nevertheless,	 CMD	 patients	 seem	 to	 have	 a	 preserved	 high	 cerebral	 integrity	 (34).	Because	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 behavioural	 signs,	 CMD	 patients	 are	 often	 wrongly	 clinically	classified	 as	 coma,	UWS	or	MCS-.	 According	 to	 a	 systematic	 review	and	meta-analysis	conducted	 by	 Kondziella	 and	 al.	 (35),	 approximately	 15%	 of	 the	 patients	 clinically	diagnosed	with	UWS	demonstrate	preserved	command	following.		
DOC	outcomes		Having	an	accurate	diagnosis	is	essential	to	direct	patients’	management	and	predict	the	outcome	 of	 their	 condition.	 Indeed,	 approximately	 50	%	 of	 patients	 suffering	 from	 a	post-traumatic	 coma	 will	 die	 (36).	 Less	 than	 25	%	 of	 patients	 suffering	 from	 a	 non-traumatic	coma	will	survive	the	first	month	(37).	Patients	that	recover	from	coma	will	usually	go	through	the	UWS	and	MCS	states.	Thirty-three	%	of	UWS	patients	with	post-
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traumatic	brain	injury	regain	consciousness	within	the	first	three	months.	One	year	post	injury,	 recovered	 consciousness	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 52%	 of	 the	 patients.	 Only	 11%	 of	patients	 in	 UWS	 post	 non-traumatic	 brain	 injury	 recovered	 consciousness	 after	 three	months	and	15%	after	a	year	(38).	More	than	70%	of	patients	emerge	from	MCS	during	the	 first	 three	months	after	coma	onset	(39).	Ten	to	50%	of	 them	will	at	 least	recover	partial	independence	for	the	activities	of	the	daily	living	and	the	locomotion	after	a	year	(39-40-41-42).	 Approximately	 30%	 of	 patients	will	 emerge	 from	MCS	more	 than	 one	year	 post	 injury,	 however	 with	 severe	 or	 complete	 disabilities	 (43).	 As	 for	 the	 CMD	patients,	to	our	knowledge,	no	data	concerning	their	outcome	is	yet	reported.				
Figure	3:	Schematic	representation	of	the	DOC	outcomes																											Traumatic	---	50%--->	Death	
Coma																										Non-traumatic	---	>75%	--->	Death																																																																																																																																													33%	the	first	3	months																										Traumatic																								Recovered	consciousness																																																																																																																																												52%	the	first	year	
UWS*																																																																																																																																											11%	the	first	3	months																								Non-traumatic																			Recovered	consciousness																																																																																																																																												15%	the	first	year		*Unresponsive	wakefulness	syndrome	
	
																																																																					>70%	the	first	3	months		---	10	to	15%	--->	Partial	independence	MCS*																	Emergence																																																																							≈30%	more	than	a	year	post	injury		---	≈100%	--->	Severely	disabled		
*Minimally	conscious	state	
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Neurobehavioural	assessment	The	 JFK	Coma	Recovery	Scale-Revised	 (CRS-R)	 (44)	 is	 used	 as	 a	 standard	 for	 assessing	the	patients’	level	of	consciousness	and	establishing	a	diagnosis.	In	a	systematic	review	of	13	behavioural	assessment	scales	conducted	by	Seel	and	al.	(45),	the	CRS-R	received	the	strongest	recommendation.	It	proved	to	have	an	excellent	content	validity	and	was	the	only	scale	addressing	all	the	Aspen	workgroup	criteria	(17).	Nevertheless,	the	rate	of	misdiagnosis	 is	 as	 high	 as	 43%	 (46-47).	 Indeed,	 it	 remains	 challenging	 to	 perform	an	accurate	evaluation.	The	clinical	assessment	can	be	influenced	by	many	different	factors	regarding	 the	patients	 themselves	 (variability	 in	 the	patients’	 response	due	 to	arousal	fluctuations,	pain,	associated	illnesses,	etc.)	or	their	environment	(medication,	position,	noise,	light,	etc.).	It	can	also	suffer	from	a	certain	variability	due	to	the	subjective	bias	of	the	observer	(examiner	dependant).	The	fact	that	the	CRS-R	quotation	depends	on	stringent	criteria,	with	notably	the	need	for	the	patients	to	repetitively	show	clear	behavioural	signs	by	responding	to	verbal	and	neurosensory	 stimulations	 through	 motor	 outputs,	 may	 lead	 to	 a	 clinical	underestimation	 of	 the	 level	 of	 consciousness	 and	more	 so	 of	 its	 content,	 in	 cases	 of	aphasia	or	blocked	motor	efferences	(see	full	CRS-R	in	appendix	A).	
Table	2:	CRS-R	items*	
Items	 Scores	
Auditory	function	scale	 0-	 None,	 1-	 Auditory	 startle,	 2-	 Localization	 to	 sound,	 3-	Reproducible	 movement	 to	 command,	 4-	 Consistent	movement	to	command	
Visual	function	scale	 0-	None,	1-	Visual	 startle,	2-	Fixation,	3-	Visual	pursuit,	4-	Object	localization,	5-	Object	recognition	
Motor	function	scale	 0-	 None/flaccid,	 1-	 Abnormal	 posturing,	 2-	 Flexion	withdrawal,	 3-	 Localization	 to	 noxious	 stimulation,	 4-	Object	 manipulation,	 5-	 Automatic	 motor	 response,	 6-	Functional	object	use		
Oromotor/verbal	function	scale	 0-	None,	 1-	 Oral	 reflexive	movement,	 2-	 Vocalization/oral	movement,	3-	Intelligible	verbalization		
Communication	scale	 0-	None,	1-	Non-functional,	2-	Functional	
Arousal	scale	 0-	 Unarousable,	 1-	 Eye	 opening	 with	 stimulation,	 2-	 Eye	opening	without	stimulation,	3-	Attention	
*	Based	on	(48)		Other	scales	can	be	used	for	the	neurobehavioural	assessment	of	patients	with	DOC.	For	example,	 the	Glasgow	Coma	 Scale	 (GCS)	 represents	 a	 simple	 and	 practical	 method	 to	assess	the	level	of	consciousness	by	measuring	three	categories	of	responsiveness:		the	
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eye	 opening,	 the	motor	 and	 verbal	 responses	 (49).	Well-established	 and	widely	 used,	some	authors	have	however	raised	concerns	about	 the	 inconsistency	and	confusion	 in	its	 use	 (50)	 and	 therefore	 its	 lack	 of	 reliability.	 Furthermore,	 in	 their	 10	 years	 data	report	of	brain	 injured	patients,	Balestreri	and	al.	 (51)	showed	a	reduction	 in	 the	GCS	predictive	value	for	outcome.	The	Wessex	Head	 Injury	Matrix	 (WHIM)	 is	 a	 62	 items	 hierarchical	 scale	 reflecting	 the	order	 of	 recovery	 for	 patients	 emerging	 from	 coma	 (52).	 Its	 items	 regard	 basic	behaviours,	social	aspects,	communication,	attention,	cognitive	capacities,	memory	and	orientation.	 Originally	 designed	 to	 monitor	 patients’	 recovery,	 it	 is	 also	 used	 as	 an	assessment	scale	for	DOC.	According	to	the	systematic	review	from	Seel	and	al.	(45),	 it	demonstrates	 a	 good	 content	 validity,	with	 items	 allowing	 the	distinction	between	VS	and	MCS,	and	an	acceptable	standardized	administration.	On	the	other	hand,	it	showed	a	lack	of	inter-rater	reliability	and	criterion	validity.	It	can	therefore	be	used	to	assess	DOC	with	moderate	reservations.	The	 Sensory	 Modality	 Assessment	 Technique	 (SMART)	 is	 a	 scale	 consisting	 in	 8	modalities.	It	evaluates	the	response	to	visual,	tactile,	auditory	and	olfactory	stimuli	as	well	 as	 the	 level	 of	 arousal,	 the	motor	 function	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 communicate	 (53).	According	 to	 the	 systematic	 review	 from	 Seel	 and	 al.	 (45),	 it	 demonstrates	 a	 good	content	validity	with	items	allowing	the	distinction	between	VS	and	MCS	and	acceptable	standardized	administration/scoring	procedures.	However,	 it	showed	limited	evidence	of	 reliability	 and	 criterion	 validity.	 It	 can	 be	 used	 to	 assess	 DOC	 with	 moderate	reservations.	In	 a	 study	 from	 the	 Acute	 Neurorehabilitation	 Unit	 (CHUV,	 Lausanne),	 the	 use	 of	 a	Complementary	 Motor	 Behavioural	 Tool	 in	 association	 with	 the	 CRS-R	 has	demonstrated	 an	 improvement	 in	 diagnosis	 and	 outcome	 predictability	 (54)	 of	 such	patients	described	as	CMD.	Recently,	a	 revised	and	simplified	version	of	 it,	 the	MBT-r,	has	 been	 validated	 as	 a	 stand-alone	 form	 (55)	 (see	 full	 MBT-r	 in	 appendix	 B).	 By	allowing	 the	 detection	 of	 subtle	 behavioural	 signs,	 the	 MBT-r	 uncovers	 evidences	 of	residual	cognition	 in	patients	considered	unconscious	(coma/UWS).	The	fact	 that	CMD	patients	 fail	 to	 evoke	 proper	 motor	 responses	 at	 bedside	 testifies	 more	 for	 an	impairment	in	the	efferent	pathways	rather	than	for	a	true	disorder	of	consciousness.		
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Table	3:	MBT-r	items*	
Items	
Positive	signs	
1.	Spontaneous	non-reflexive	movements	
2.	Response	to	command	
3.	Visual	fixation	or	visual	pursuit	
4.	Motor	responses	in	a	motivational	context	
5.	Responses	to	noxious	stimulation	
Negative	signs	
6.	Abnormal	posturing	or	neurovegetative	responses	to	stimulation	
7.	Signs	of	roving	eyes	or	absence	of	oculocephalic	reflex	
*Based	on	(55)	Because	 CMD	 patients	 demonstrate	 preserved	 cognitive	 capacities,	 it	 is	 essential	 for	them	to	be	distinguished	from	the	DOC	patients,	as	 their	outcome	could	potentially	be	different.	
Figure	4:	Schematic	of	the	three	dimensions	of	detecting	consciousness* 
	
	
	
Legends:	VS:	vegetative	state,	MCS-:	minimally	conscious	state	without	language	function;	MCS+:	minimally	
conscious	state	with	language	function;	CMD:	cognitive	motor	dissociation;	LIS:	locked-in	syndrome	
*Adapted	from	(31)	
Coma	
MCS-	 MCS+	VS LIS 
Full	recov-ery 
Covert	cognition	(fMRI/EEG) 
Motor	function (CRS-R) 
Overt	cognition (CRS-R) CMD	
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In	this	study,	we	will	therefore	1)	investigate	the	consciousness/functional	recovery	in	patients	with	disorders	of	consciousness	(DOC)	as	well	as	those	presenting	with	CMD,	2)	compare	 the	different	 functional	outcomes	 to	see	whether	 the	outcomes	of	 those	with	preserved	 cognition	 differ	 and	 3)	 evaluate	 the	 patients’	 clinical	 evolution	 between	admission	and	discharge.			We	hypothesize	that	the	functional	outcomes	of	the	CMD	patients	will	differ	from	those	with	DOC.	Furthermore,	because	of	their	preserved	cognition,	we	expect	CMD	patients	to	present	a	better	potential	of	improvement	and	therefore,	better	outcomes	than	the	DOC	patients.		
	
METHODOLOGY	
Participants	We	 retrospectively	 enrolled	 the	 145	 patients	 that	 have	 been	 admitted	 to	 the	 Acute	Neurorehabilitation	 Unit	 (NRA)	 of	 the	 University	 Hospital	 of	 Lausanne	 (CHUV,	Lausanne,	Switzerland)	from	November	2011	to	August	2018.	In	order	to	be	included,	patients	had	to	be	1)	at	 least	16	years	old,	2)	suffering	from	a	severe	acquired	brain	 injury	requiring	an	intermediate	care	structure	and	3)	receiving	an	Early	Rehabilitation	Barthel	Index	(ERBI)	score	<30.	The	exclusion	criteria	were	any	co-existent	non-neurological	disorders,	neuromuscular	disturbances	 and/or	 diseases	 involving	 peripheral	 nervous	 system	 (critical	 illness	polyneuropathy,	spinal	muscular	atrophy,	Guillain-Barré	Syndrome).	Among	the	145	patients	enrolled,	4	were	excluded.	The	 141	 patients	 included	 suffered	 from	 traumatic	 and	 non-traumatic	 brain	 injuries.	Traumatic	 brain	 injuries	 (TBI)	 include	 motor	 vehicle	 collisions,	 falls	 and	 assaults,	whereas	 non-traumatic	 brain	 injuries	 (NTBI)	 consist	 of	 vascular	 injuries,	 anoxia,	encephalopathies	and	neoplasms.		
Procedure	Patients’	 neurobehavioural	 assessment	 was	 performed	 in	 the	 ICU,	 before	 their	admission	 in	 the	 NRA	 unit,	 using	 the	 CRS-R	 and	 the	 MBT-r.	 The	 patients	 were	 then	separated	 in	 3	 categories	 according	 to	 their	 diagnosis:	 CMD,	 DOC	 and	 NON-DOC	(patients	with	no	pathological	interaction	when	stimulated	after	withdrawal	of	sedation,	considered	as	controls).	All	the	patients	underwent	a	clinical	and	neurological	evaluation	at	both	admission	and	
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discharge	from	the	NRA	unit.	During	their	stay,	they	benefited	from	an	individualized	intensive	(at	least	3	hours	a	day,	5	 days	 a	 week)	 rehabilitation	 program,	 which	 included	 physical,	 occupational,	neuropsychological	and	speech	therapies.	Functional	 outcomes	 were	 investigated	 at	 their	 admission	 and	 discharge	 using	 the	following	outcome	scales	(full	outcomes	scales	can	be	found	in	appendix	C):	
The	Glasgow	Outcome	scale	(GOS)	(56):	was	first	published	in	1975	by	Jennett	and	Bond	(57)	 in	an	effort	 to	objectively	assess	 the	outcome	of	 the	 increasing	survivors	of	brain	injuries.	Initially	designed	to	assess	the	patients’	outcomes	in	community,	it	can	be	used	in	 both	 in	 acute	 and	 chronic	 settings	 (58).	 Since	 its	 publication,	 it	 has	 been	 widely	recognised	 as	 a	 simple,	 reliable	 and	 valid	 outcome	 measure.	 It	 consists	 in	 five	descriptive	 categories	 (dead;	 vegetative;	 severely	 disabled;	moderately	 disabled;	 good	recovery)	 and	 is	 often	 separated	 in	 two:	 favourable	 (moderately	 disabled;	 good	recovery)	versus	unfavourable	outcomes	(dead;	vegetative;	severely	disabled). 
The	Early	Rehabilitation	Barthel	 Index	(ERBI)	 (59):	 an	 extended	 version	 of	 the	Barthel	index	(60)	(which	is	focusing	more	on	the	daily	activities)	providing	a	better	assessment	of	 patients	 in	 early	 rehabilitation,	 as	 it	 contains	 items	 concerning	 tracheostomy,	mechanical	ventilation	and	dysphagia.	The	scoring	of	ERBI	is	separated	in	4	categories.	A	score	between	-75	and	30	or	>30	 is	considered	a	good	outcome,	whereas	a	score	<-200	or	between	-200	and	-76	is	considered	a	poor	outcome.	
The	Disability	Rating	 Scale	 (DRS)	 (61):	 designed	 to	 assess	 disability	 after	 brain	 injury	and	to	follow	the	progress	during	recovery,	it	can	therefore	be	administrated	in	a	large	variety	of	settings	from	the	acute	care	units	to	community	(62).	It	evaluates	eight	sub-categories	 (eye	 opening,	 communication	 ability,	 motor	 response,	 feeding,	 toileting,	grooming,	level	of	functioning	and	employability)	and	a	score	≤	11	is	considered	a	good	outcome.	
The	Rancho	Los	Amigos	Levels	of	Cognitive	Functioning	(LCF)	(63):	initially	developed	to	assess	 patients	 emerging	 from	 coma,	 it	 can	 follow	 the	 cognitive	 and	 behavioural	recovery	of	patients	with	brain	injury.	Often	paired	with	the	Glasgow	Coma	Scale	(GCS)	for	the	initial	assessment	of	patients	suffering	from	brain	injury,	its	use	is	however	not	limited	 to	 the	 acute	 phase.	 It	 consists	 in	 ten	 categories	 going	 from	 total	 assistance	 to	independence.	 Patients	 classified	 from	 the	 6th	 category	 up	 to	 the	 10th	 are	 considered	having	a	good	outcome.	
The	modified	Rankin	Scale	(mRS)	(64-65):	widely	used	to	evaluate	patients	after	a	stroke,	it	assesses	the	degree	of	global	disability	and	dependence.	The	scoring	goes	from	0	(no	symptom)	to	6	(death).	A	score	≤3	is	considered	a	good	outcome.	
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The	 Functional	 Ambulation	 Classification	 Scale	 (FAC)	 (66):	 evaluates	 the	 functional	walking	 capacity	 with	 a	 score	 from	 0	 to	 6	 and	 offers	 an	 easier	 alternative	 to	 the	measurement	of	the	walking	velocity.	A	score	≥2	is	considered	a	good	outcome.	
Protocol	approval	and	patients’	consent	The	 protocol	 of	 this	 study	 has	 been	 approved	 by	 the	 Ethics	 Committee	 of	 Lausanne	(142-09).	The	patients’	legal	representatives	were	informed	and	gave	a	written	consent.	
Statistics	We	 first	 analysed	 our	 data	 using	 descriptive	 statistics	 to	 observe	 the	 general	distribution	of	the	variables	and	to	detect	any	extreme	values	(outliers).	We	 then	 performed	 univariate	 analysis.	 In	 order	 to	 determine	 if	 the	 variables’	distribution	differed	 from	one	group	to	another,	we	compared	them	two	by	 two	using	Student’s	t-test.	Results	were	considered	significant	for	a	p-value	<	0.05.		Because	 certain	 variables	 took	 only	 a	 limited	 amount	 of	 values,	 we	 analysed	 the	distribution	differences	between	the	different	groups	using	Fischer	test.	We	 also	 investigate	 the	 sensitivity	 and	 specificity	 of	 the	 prediction	 of	 consciousness	recovery	according	 to	 the	CRS-R.	We	considered	as	 true	positive	outcome	the	patients	classified	as	CMD	(as	opposed	to	DOC).	Intervals	of	confidence	(CI)	were	computed	using	the	Wilson	method.			
RESULTS	Among	 the	 141	 patients	 included,	 105	were	 diagnosed	 as	 CMD	 (74.47%),	 19	 as	 DOC	(13.47%)	and	17	as	NON-DOC	(12.06%).	In	the	CMD	category,	39	were	female	(37.14%)	and	66	male	(62.86%).	The	patients’	age	varied	from	17	to	83	years	old.	Forty	(38.10%)	suffered	from	traumatic	brain	injury	and	65	(61.90%)	from	non-traumatic	brain	injury.	The	length	of	their	hospitalization	in	the	NRA	unit	varied	from	7	to	77	days.	Concerning	their	 diagnosis	 according	 to	 the	 CRS-R,	 21	were	 diagnosed	 in	 coma,	 39	 in	 UWS,	 1	 in	UWS/MCS	and	44	in	MCS.	In	the	DOC	patients’	category,	11	were	female	(57.89%)	and	8	(42.11%)	male,	aged	from	17	to	75	years	old.	Eleven	(57.89%)	of	them	suffered	from	a	traumatic	 brain	 injury	 whereas	 the	 other	 8	 (42.11%)	 suffered	 from	 a	 non-traumatic	brain	injury.	Their	stay	in	the	NRA	unit	varied	from	8	to	41	days.	Concerning	the	NON-DOC	patients,	4	were	female	(23.53%)	and	13	were	male	(76.47%),	aged	from	24	to	78	years	old.	Three	(17.65%)	suffered	from	a	traumatic	brain	injury	and	14	(82.35%)	from	a	non-traumatic	brain	injury,	with	a	length	of	stay	varying	from	7	to	46	days.		
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Table	4:	Summary	of	the	demographic	and	clinical	information	
		 CMD	patients	 DOC	patients	 NON-DOC	patients	Number		 105		 19	 17	Sex	F/M	(n)	 39/66	 11/8	 4/13	Age	(years)	 From	17	to	83	 From	17	to	75	 From	24	to	78	Aetiology	TBI/NTBI	(n)	 40/65	 11/8	 3/14	Length	of	stay	(days)	 From	7	to	77	 From	8	to	41	 From	7	to	46	
Abbreviations:	TBI:	traumatic	brain	injury;	NTBI:	non-traumatic	brain	injury	
	
	
The	Glasgow	Outcome	Scale	(GOS)	At	admission,	the	scoring	of	the	GOS	took	only	two	different	values.	Fourteen	of	the	CMD	patients	(13.33%)	and	15	of	the	DOC	patients	(78.95%)	received	a	score	of	2,	whereas	91	of	the	CMD	patients	(86.67%),	4	of	the	DOC	patients	(21.05%)	and	the	17	NON-DOC	patients	(100%)	received	a	score	of	3.	Lower	scores	were	observed	for	the	DOC	patients	than	 for	 the	 CMD	 and	 NON-DOC	 ones	 and	 Fischer’s	 exact	 test	 for	 differences	 in	distribution	 was	 significant	 (p-value<0.001	 in	 both	 cases).	 Fischer’s	 exact	 test	 for	differences	in	distribution	between	the	CMD	and	NON-DOC	patients	was	not	significant	(p-value=0.214).	At	discharge,	3	of	the	CMD	patients	(2.85%),	1	of	the	DOC	patients	(5.26%)	and	1	of	the	NON-DOC	 patients	 (5.88%)	 received	 a	 score	 of	 1.	 Three	 (2.85%)	 of	 the	 CMD	 and	 8	(42.11%)	of	the	DOC	patients	received	a	score	of	2.	Sixty-five	(61.91%)	of	the	CMD,	10	(52.63%)	 of	 the	DOC	 and	 8	 (47.06%)	 of	 the	NON-DOC	patients	 received	 a	 score	 of	 3.	Twenty-seven	(25.72%)	of	the	CMD	and	5	(29.41%)	of	the	DOC	patients	received	a	score	of	4.	Seven	(6.67%)	of	CMD	and	3	(17.65%)	of	the	NON-DOC	patients	received	a	score	of	5.	None	of	the	DOC	patients	evolved	enough	to	meet	those	higher	scores.	Lower	scores	were	observed	for	the	DOC	patients	than	for	the	CMD	and	NON-DOC	ones	and	Fischer’s	exact	 test	 for	differences	 in	distribution	was	significant	 (p-value<0.001	 in	both	cases).	Fischer’s	 exact	 test	 for	 differences	 in	 distribution	 between	 the	 CMD	 and	 NON-DOC	patients	was	not	significant	(p-value=0.214).	During	their	hospitalization,	5	(4.77%)	of	the	CMD,	1	(5.26%)	of	the	DOC	and	1	(5.88%)	of	the	NON-DOC	patients	lowered	their	score	from	1	or	2	points.	The	scoring	remained	the	same	 for	53	(50.48%)	of	 the	CMD,	12	(63.16%)	of	 the	DOC	and	8	(47.06%)	of	 the	NON-DOC	 patients.	 Forty-seven	 (44.75%)	 of	 the	 CMD,	 6	 (31.58%)	 of	 the	 DOC	 and	 8	(47.06%)	of	 the	NON-DOC	patients	 improved	 their	 score	 from	1	or	2	points.	 Fischer’s	exact	 test	 for	 differences	 in	 distribution	 was	 not	 significant	 (CMD	 vs.	 DOC,	 p-value=0.535;	CMD	vs.	NON-DOC,	p-value=0.403;	DOC	vs.	NON-DOC,	p-value=0.195).		
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Table	5:	Summary	of	the	GOS	results	
Variable	 Value		 CMD	n.	 DOC	n.	 NON-DOC	
n.	
CMD	prop.	 DOC	prop.	 NON-DOC	
prop.	GOS	 at	admission	 2	 14	 15	 0	 0.13333	 0.78947	 0	3	 91	 4	 17	 0.86667	 0.21043	 1		GOS	 at	discharge	 1	 3	 1	 1	 0.02857	 0.05263	 0.05882	2	 3	 8	 0	 0.02857	 0.42105	 0	3	 65	 10	 8	 0.61905	 0.52632	 0.47059	4	 27	 0	 5	 0.25714	 0	 0.29412	5	 7	 0	 3	 0.06667	 0	 0.17647		GOS	difference	 -2	 3	 0	 1	 0.02857	 0	 0.05882	-1	 2	 1	 0	 0.01905	 0.05263	 0	0	 53	 12	 8	 0.50476	 0.63158	 0.47059	1	 40	 6	 5	 0.38095	 0.31579	 0.29412	2	 7	 0	 3	 0.06667	 0	 0.17647	
Abbreviations:	n:	number;	prop:	proportion	
	
Table	6:	Boxplots	of	the	GOS	distribution	
	
	
The	Early	Rehabilitation	Barthel	Index	(ERBI)	The	mean	±	standard	deviation	(SD)	of	the	scores	at	admission	was	-248.48	±	69.97	for	the	CMD	patients,	-289.48	±	36.63	for	the	DOC	patients	and	-185.89	±	99.29	for	the	NON-DOC	patients.	The	variables’	distribution	significantly	differed	between	the	3	categories	(Student’s	t-test:	 	CMD	vs.	DOC,	p-value<0.001;	CDM	vs.	NON-DOC,	p-value=0.022;	DOC	vs.	NON-DOC,	p-value<0.001).	At	discharge,	the	mean	of	the	scores	was	-19.20	±	108.99	for	the	CDM	patients,	-222.27	±	92.19	for	the	DOC	patients	and	16.48	±	81.14	for	the	NON-DOC	patients.	Student’s	t-test	attested	a	significant	difference	in	distribution	between	the	DOC	category	and	both	the	CMD	 and	 NON-DOC	 categories,	 with	 a	 p-value<0.001.	 No	 significant	 difference	 was	found	between	the	CMD	and	NON-DOC	categories	(Student’s	t-test,	p-value=0.123)	CMD	 and	 NON-DOC	 patients	 improved	 significantly	 more	 their	 score	 during	 their	
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hospitalization	when	compared	to	the	DOC	patients,	with	a	mean’s	difference	of	229.29	±	108.68	and	202.36	±	92.57	versus	66.85	±	86.47	(Student’s	t-test,	p-value<0.001).	No	significant	 difference	 regarding	 the	 scores’	 improvement	 between	 the	 CMD	 and	NON-DOC	patients	was	found	(Student’s	t-test,	p-value=0.289).	
	
Table	7:	Detailed	ERBI	distribution	
Variable	 GRP	 Ndiffval	 Mean	 SD	 Median	 IQR	 Min	 Max	ERBI	 at	admission		 CMD	 11	 -248.476	 69.9695	 -275	 100	 -325	 10	DOC	 4	 -289.474	 36.6248	 -275	 50	 -325	 -175	NON-DOC	 10	 -185.882	 99.2824	 -175	 150	 -325	 0	ERBI	 at	discharge	 CMD	 44	 -19.1905	 108.984	 10	 100	 -325	 100	DOC	 10	 -222.632	 92.1859	 -270	 100	 -325	 -25	NON-DOC	 15	 16.4706	 81.1396	 50	 75	 -225	 100	ERBI	difference	 CMD	 51	 229.286	 108.673	 245	 135	 0	 420	DOC	 8	 66.8421	 86.4615	 50	 100	 0	 300	NON-DOC	 17	 202.353	 92.5695	 225	 130	 50	 375	
Abbreviations:	GRP:	group;	Ndiffval:	 number	of	different	 values;	 SD:	 standard-deviation;	 IQR:	 interquartile	
range	
Table	8:	Boxplots	of	the	ERBI	distribution	
	
	
The	Disability	Rating	Scale	(DRS)	The	 scores’	 distribution	 at	 admission	 was	 significantly	 different	 between	 the	 3	categories	(Student’s	t-test,	p-value<0.001	for	each	comparison:	CMD	vs.	DOC,	CDM	vs.	NON-DOC	and	DOC	vs.	NON-DOC).	The	NON-DOC	patients	globally	received	lower	scores	(16.30	±	4.67)	than	the	CMD	patients	(21.55	±	3.33)	and	the	DOC	patients	(24.95	±	2.18).	The	difference	persisted	at	discharge	with,	according	to	Student’s	t-test,	a	p-value<0.001	when	 comparing	 CMD	 vs.	 DOC	 and	 DOC	 vs.	 NON-DOC,	 and	 a	 p-value=0.004	 when	comparing	CDM	vs.	NON-DOC.	The	scores	remain	lower	for	the	NON-DOC	patients	(6.77	
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±	4.43)	when	compared	to	the	CMD	(10.75	±	6.70)	and	DOC	patients	(22.85	±	4.01).	During	their	stay,	the	CMD	and	NON-DOC	patients	lowered	significantly	more	their	score	(-10.80	±	6.29	and	-9.53	±	3.94	respectively)	than	the	DOC	patients	(-2.11	±	3.50)	with	in	both	comparisons	a	p-value	<0.001	according	to	the	Student’s	t-test.	The	evolution	of	the	scores	 of	 the	 CMD	 and	NON-DOC	 patients	was	 not	 significantly	 different	 (Student’s	 t-test,	p-value=0.272).	
Table	9:	Detailed	DRS	distribution	
Variable	 GRP	 Ndiffval	 Mean	 SD	 Median	 IQR	 Min	 Max	DRS	 at	admission		 CMD	 17	 21.5429	 3.3225	 22	 4	 11	 29	DOC	 6	 24.9474	 2.17239	 24	 4	 23	 29	NON-DOC	 11	 16.2941	 4.66054	 18	 7	 8	 23	DRS	 at	discharge	 CMD	 26	 10.7429	 6.6982	 9	 9	 1	 29	DOC	 11	 22.8421	 4.00365	 23	 3	 11	 29	NON-DOC	 11	 6.76471	 4.42337	 6	 6	 1	 18	DRS	difference	 CMD	 27	 -10.8	 6.28092	 -12	 8	 -22	 11	DOC	 10	 -2.10526	 3.49436	 -2	 3.5	 -12	 5	NON-DOC	 11	 -9.52941	 3.93887	 -10	 3	 -15	 0	
Abbreviations:	GRP:	group;	Ndiffval:	 number	of	different	 values;	 SD:	 standard-deviation;	 IQR:	 interquartile	
range	
	
Table	11:	Boxplots	of	the	DRS	distribution	
	
	
The	Rancho	Los	Amigos	Levels	of	Cognitive	Functioning	(LCF)	At	 admission,	 the	 scores’	 distribution	 was	 significantly	 different	 between	 the	 3	categories	 (Student’s	 t-test,	 p-value<0.001	 for	 each	 comparison).	 	 The	 NON-DOC	patients	globally	received	the	higher	scores	with	a	mean	of	4.71	±	0.99	when	compared	to	the	CMD	patients	(3.21±1.04)	and	the	DOC	ones	(2±0.48).	A	significant	difference	persisted	at	discharge,	with	a	mean	of	7.12	±	1.73	for	the	NON-
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DOC	 patients,	 6.06±1.87	 for	 the	 CDM	 patients	 and	 2.58±1.08	 for	 the	 DOC	 patients	(Student’s	t-test:	CMD	vs.	DOC,	p-value<0.001;	CDM	vs.	NON-DOC,	p-value=0.03;	DOC	vs.	NON-DOC,	p-value<0.001).	The	difference	between	the	scores	at	admission	and	discharge	were	significantly	greater	for	 the	 CMD	 (2.85±1.79)	 and	 the	 NON-DOC	 (2.42	 ±	 1.38)	 patients	 than	 for	 the	 DOC	patients	 (0.58±0.97),	 with	 a	 p-value<0.001	 according	 to	 Student’s	 t-test	 for	 both	comparisons.	 No	 significant	 difference	 was	 found	 between	 the	 CMD	 and	 NON-DOC	categories	(Student’s	t-test,	p-value=0.256).	
	
Table	11:	Detailed	LCF	distribution	
Variable	 GRP	 Ndiffval	 Mean	 SD	 Median	 IQR	 Min	 Max	LCF	 at	admission		 CMD	 5	 3.20952	 1.05334	 3	 2	 2	 6	DOC	 3	 2	 0.4714	 2	 0	 1	 3	NON-DOC	 5	 4.70588	 0.98518	 5	 1	 3	 7		LCF	 at	discharge	 CMD	 10	 6.05714	 1.85963	 6	 1	 1	 10	DOC	 5	 2.57895	 1.07061	 3	 1	 1	 5	NON-DOC	 7	 7.11765	 1.7278	 7	 3	 4	 10	LCF	difference	 CMD	 10	 2.84762	 1.78013	 3	 2	 -3	 7	DOC	 5	 0.57895	 0.96124	 1	 1	 -1	 3	NON-DOC	 6	 2.41176	 1.37199	 2	 2	 0	 5	
Abbreviations:	GRP:	group;	Ndiffval:	number	of	different	 values;	 SD:	 standard-deviation;	 IQR:	 interquartile	
range	
	
Table	12:	Boxplots	of	the	LCF	distribution	
	
	
The	modified	Rankin	Scale	(mRS)	At	admission,	the	mRS	took	only	two	different	values:	6	(5.71%)	of	the	CMD	patients	and	4	(23.53%)	of	the	NON-DOC	patients	received	a	score	of	4,	whereas	99	(94.29%)	of	the	
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CMD	patients,	all	of	the	DOC	patients	(100%)	and	13	(76.47%)	of	the	NON-DOC	patients	received	a	score	of	5.	Fischer’s	exact	test	for	differences	in	distribution	between	the	CMD	and	the	DOC	patients	was	not	significant	(p-value=0.589).	Lower	scores	were	observed	for	the	NON-DOC	category	than	for	the	CMD	and	DOC	ones	and	Fischer’s	exact	test	 for	differences	in	distribution	was	significant	(NON-DOC	vs.	CMD,	p-value=0.033;	NON-DOC	vs.	DOC,	p-value=0.004).	CMD	and	NON-DOC	patients	received	at	discharge	a	significantly	better	score	(3.78±1.01	and	 3.53±1.13)	 than	 the	 DOC	 patients	 (4.85±0.51),	 with	 a	 p-value<0.001	 in	 both	comparisons	(Student’s	t-test).	The	scoring	of	the	CMD	and	the	NON-DOC	patients	was	not	significantly	different	(Student’s	t-test,	p-value=0.413).	The	CMD	and	NON-DOC	patients	also	showed	a	significantly	better	improving	than	the	DOC	ones,	with	a	difference	of	-1.18±0.96	and	-1.24±0.98	versus	-0.16±0.51	in	the	DOC	category	 (Student’s	 t-test,	 p-value<0.001	 for	 both	 comparisons).	 Again,	 no	 significant	difference	was	 found	 between	 the	 CMD	 and	 NON-DOC	 categories	 (Student’s	 t-test,	 p-value=0.803).		
Table	13:	Summary	of	the	mRS	results	at	admission	
Variable	 Value	 CMD	n.	 DOC	n.	 NON-DOC	n.	 CMD	prop.	 DOC	prop.	 NON-DOC	
prop.	mRS	 at	admission	 4	 6	 0	 4	 0.05714	 0	 0.23529	5	 99	 19	 13	 0.94286	 1	 0.76471	
Abbreviations:	n:	number;	prop:	proportion	
	
Table	14:	Detailed	mRS	distribution		
Variable	 GRP	 Ndiffval	 Mean	 SD	 Median	 IQR	 Min	 Max	mRS	 at	discharge		 CMD	 6	 3.77143	 1.00247	 4	 1	 1	 6	DOC	 3	 4.84211	 0.50146	 5	 0	 4	 6	NON-DOC	 5	 3.52941	 1.12459	 4	 1	 2	 6	mRS	difference	 CMD	 6	 -1.17143	 0.95532	 -1	 1	 -4	 1	DOC	 3	 -0.15789	 0.50146	 0	 0	 -1	 1	NON-DOC	 5	 -1.23529	 0.97014	 -1	 1	 -3	 1	
Abbreviations:	GRP:	group;	Ndiffval:	number	of	different	 values;	 SD:	 standard-deviation;	 IQR:	 interquartile	
range	
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Table	15:	Boxplots	of	the	mRS	distribution	
	
	
The	Functional	Ambulation	Classification	Scale	(FAC)	CMD	and	NON-DOC	patients	had	a	significantly	better	score	at	discharge	(1.30±1.38	and	1.65±1.37)	when	compared	 to	 the	DOC	patients	 (0.06±0.23),	with	a	p-value<0.001	 for	both	comparisons	(Student’s	t-test),	but	no	significant	difference	between	the	CDM	and	NON-DOC	patients	was	found	(Student’s	t-test,	p-value=0.336).	
	
Table	16:	Detailed	FAC	distribution		
Variable	 GRP	 Ndiffval	 Mean	 SD	 Median	 IQR	 Min	 Max	
		FAC	 at	discharge	
CMD	 6	 1.29524	 1.37927	 1	 2	 0	 5	
DOC	 2	 0.05263	 0.22942	 0	 0	 0	 1	
NON-DOC	 5	 1.64706	 1.36662	 1	 2	 0	 4	
Abbreviations:	GRP:	group;	Ndiffval:	 number	of	different	 values;	 SD:	 standard-deviation;	 IQR:	 interquartile	
range	
	
Table	17:	Boxplots	for	the	FAC	distribution	
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Consciousness	recovery	According	to	the	CRS-R,	75	of	the	CMD	patients	(71.43%)	and	1	of	DOC	patient	(5.26%)	presented	a	potential	of	consciousness	recovery,	whereas	30	of	the	CMD	(28.57%)	and	18	of	the	DOC	patients	(94.74%)	did	not.	The	sensibility	and	specificity	were	estimated	at	71.43%	(97.5%	CI:	62.15-79.19%)	and	94.74%	(97.5%	CI:	75.36-99.06%)	respectively.	The	positive	predictive	value	was	estimated	at	98.68	%	(97.5%	CI:	92.92-99.77%)	and	the	negative	predictive	value	at	37.50%	(97.5%	CI:	25.21-51.64%).	
	
Table	18:	Summary	of	the	sensibility	and	specificity	of	the	prediction	of	consciousness	recovery	according	to	
the	CRS-R.	
	
	
DISCUSSION	In	our	study,	we	can	overall	see	that	CMD	patients	are	associated	with	better	functional	outcomes	 than	 the	 patients	 suffering	 from	 DOC	 and	 furthermore,	 seem	 to	 have	 very	similar	outcomes	to	the	NON-DOC	patients.	At	 admission,	 three	 of	 the	 outcome	 scales	 (ERBI,	 DRS	 and	 LCF)	 are	 already	 able	 to	highlight	 a	 significant	difference	between	 the	 three	 categories.	The	NON-DOC	patients	received	 the	 better	 scores.	 The	 CMD	 patients	 received	 intermediate	 scores,	 less	favourable	than	the	NON-DOC	patients,	but	significantly	better	than	the	DOC	ones.	This	confirms	the	fact	that	patients	with	covert	consciousness	can	already	be	detected	in	the	acute	 phase.	 Indeed,	 Edlow	 and	 al.	 (31)	 revealed	 that	 fMRI	 and	 EEG	 could	 detect	command-following	and	higher-order	cortical	 function	in	patients	suffering	from	acute	brain	injuries,	in	ICU	settings.	Likewise,	Pincherle	and	al.	(55)	demonstrated	the	ability	of	the	MBT-r	to	clinically	identify	patients	with	residual	cognition	in	the	early	stage	after	a	 brain	 injury.	 	 Furthermore,	 Braiman	 and	 al.	 (67)	 investigated	 the	 EEG	 response	latencies	 to	 natural	 speech	 envelope	 and	 were	 able	 to	 identify	 a	 subgroup	 of	 acute	severely	brain-injured	patients	capable	of	fMRI	mentally	imagery	tasks	and	whose	EEG	
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response	latencies	were	undistinguishable	from	those	in	healthy	subjects. The	GOS	and	the	 mRS	 prove	 to	 be	 not	 adequate	 to	 detect	 any	 significant	 difference	 between	respectively	the	CMD	and	NON-DOC	patients	or	the	CMD	and	DOC	patients.	Although	the	GOS	is	widely	used	and	recognized	for	outcome	measures,	 it	has	been	criticised	for	 its	lack	of	sensitivity	(68).	Some	reservations	concerning	its	reliability	were	also	expressed	by	Lu	and	al.	(69)	who	investigated	the	impact	of	misclassifications	in	clinical	trials.	In	a	systematic	review	from	Quinn	and	al.	(64),	the	reliability	of	the	mRS	remained	subject	to	uncertainties	with	potentially	important	inter-observer	variability. At	discharge,	the	GOS,	ERBI,	mRS	and	FAC	show	significant	differences	between	the	CMD	and	 DOC	 patients,	 but	 CMD	 and	 NON-DOC	 patients	 don’t	 seem	 to	 significantly	 differ.	Those	findings	reinforce	the	importance	of	detecting	CMD	patients	as,	even	though	they	are	often	wrongly	diagnosed	as	DOC,	their	outcome	seems	to	be	closer	to	the	NON-DOC	patients	that	the	DOC	ones.	The	DRS	and	LCF	can	still	highlight	a	significant	difference	between	 the	 three	 categories,	 the	 CMD	 patients	 showing	 a	 better	 functional	 recovery	than	the	DOC	patients,	but	less	favourable	than	the	NON-DOC	patients.	Those	two	scales	have	been	designed	not	only	to	assess	patients	emerging	from	coma	but	also	throughout	their	recovery	and	reinsertion	into	community	(62-63).	Unlike	the	other	scales,	the	DRS	design	 allows	 the	 scoring	 and	 recognition	 of	 cognitive	 capacities	 independently	 from	motor	abilities.	It	also	contains	items	in	regard	of	the	level	of	functioning,	from	not	only	the	physical	 aspect,	but	 also	 through	mental,	 emotional	 and	 social	perspective.	For	 its	part,	 the	 LCF	 allows	 the	 investigation	 of	 neuropsychological	 aspects	 absent	 from	 the	other	scales’	scoring,	such	as	memory,	learning	capacities	and	ability	to	experience	and	recognise	 feelings.	 The	 fact	 that	 those	 two	 scales	 investigate	 in	 a	 more	 complex	 and	detailed	manner	 the	different	aspects	sustaining	recovery	may	provide	an	explanation	for	their	higher	sensitivity	to	assess	subtle	differences	in	patients	with	outcomes	already	considered	as	good.	Indeed,	when	looking	at	the	distribution	of	the	outcome	scores,	the	CMD	 and	 NON-DOC	 patients	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 reach	 values	 considered	 as	 “good	outcome”	 than	 the	 DOC	 patients.	 In	 fact,	 all	 the	 DOC	 patients	 received	 at	 discharge	 a	score	 considered	 as	 “poor	 outcome”	 when	 assessed	 with	 the	 GOS,	 LCF	 and	 FAC.	Although	 CMD	 patients	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 have	 good	 outcomes,	 it	 is	 important	 to	remember	 that	 not	 all	 of	 them	will.	 The	 highlighting	 of	 covert	 consciousness	 doesn’t	assure	a	good	outcome.	Indeed,	CMD	patients	may	have	preserved	cognitive	capacities	but	 still	 remain	 unable	 to	 verbally	 or	 behaviourally	 express	 it,	 therefore	 preventing	them	 to	 progress	 and	 reach	 good	 recovery.	 The	 inability	 to	 express	 those	 preserved	cognitive	capacities	can	be	due	to	permanent	impairments	in	efferent	pathways	but	can	also	be	correlated	to	the	multidimensional	character	of	consciousness	(70).	Indeed,	the	preserved	cognition	 in	CMD	patients	 represents	only	one	dimension	of	 those	patients’	consciousness.	The	other	dimensions,	such	as	the	level	of	arousal,	contribute	and	bring	heterogeneity	to	their	global	functional	outcome.	For	example,	within	the	CMD	category,	the	 DRS	 scores	 go	 from	 1	 to	 29,	meaning	 from	 patients	with	 complete	 independence	with	 only	 a	 limitation	 in	 employment,	 to	 patients	 completely	 dependant	 with	 no	communication	nor	motor	ability	and	no	eyes	opening,	even	to	painful	stimulation.	
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The	fact	that	CMD	patients	have	better	outcomes	at	discharge	than	the	DOC	patients	can	partly	 be	 due	 to	 their	 higher	 scores	 at	 admission,	 but	 they	 also	 benefit	 from	 a	significantly	better	improving	of	their	scores	during	their	hospitalization,	as	shown	with	four	 of	 the	 outcome	 scales	 (ERBI,	 DRS,	 LCF	 and	mRS).	 	 Furthermore,	 the	 potential	 of	improvement	of	their	scores	during	their	stay	is	very	similar	to	the	NON-DOC	patients,	as	 no	 significant	 difference	 can	 be	 seen	 when	 comparing	 those	 two	 categories.	 The	presence	 of	 preserved	 cognition	 in	 CMD	 patients	 is	 an	 indicator	 of	 preserved	 high-processing	 integration.	 This	 indicates	 that	 such	 patients	 have	 better	 connected	 brain	networks	than	the	DOC	patients	and	therefore	more	resources	to	mobilise	and	commit,	which	 could	explain	 their	better	potential	 of	 improvement.	Another	explanation	 could	be	 motivational.	 Indeed,	 the	 presence	 of	 conscious	 awareness	 in	 CMD	 patients	 may	allow	 them	 to	 wilfully	 improve	 their	 recovery,	 as	 motivation	 is	 thought	 to	 play	 an	important	part	in	rehabilitation	(71-72).	Because	they	seem	to	have	a	better	potential	of	improvement,	 CMD	 patients	 should	 be	 identified	 in	 order	 to	 benefit	 from	 the	 most	appropriate	 care/rehabilitation	 as	 they	 may	 retain	 recruitable	 capacities	 to	 reengage	with	 their	 environment	 (32),	 in	 the	 acute	 phase	 as	 well	 as	 the	 chronic	 one.	 Indeed,	Dinkel	 and	 al.	 (73)	 documented	 significant	 and	 durable	 changes	 in	 the	 white	 matter	microarchitecture	 up	 to	 2	 years	 post	 traumatic	 brain	 injury.	 The	 scores’	 difference	between	 admission	 and	 discharge	 does	 give	 us	 information	 about	 the	 amount	 of	 the	patients’	 progress,	 but	 this	 information	 should	be	 taken	 carefully,	 as	 it	 should	 also	be	adjusted	to	the	length	of	hospitalization	in	order	to	avoid	any	misinterpretation.	Indeed,	the	length	of	stay	varied	from	7	to	77	days	in	the	CMD	category,	from	8	to	41	days	in	the	DOC	one	and	from	7	to	46	days	in	the	DOC	category.	The	choice	of	the	different	outcome	scales	used	in	our	study	was	based	on	the	fact	that	each	of	them	brought	a	different	perspective	to	the	results.	 Indeed,	their	scoring	items	differ,	 which	 allows	 a	 broader	 view	 of	 the	 different	 aspects	 influencing	 functional	outcomes.	For	example,	the	FAC	is	the	only	scale	assessing	the	walking	capacity,	which	gives	precious	 information	on	 the	 functional	 independence.	The	ERBI	details	 the	daily	activities,	informing	on	the	patient’s	personal	autonomy.	The	DRS	allows	the	assessment	of	 cognitive	 capacities	 independently	 from	 the	 motor	 abilities,	 an	 important	 aspect	when	not	wanting	to	underestimate	cognition	in	patients	with	motor	impairments.	The	LCF	 investigates	 neuropsychological	 aspects	 such	 as	 memory,	 learning,	 planning,	attention,	etc.,	which	gives	an	impression	on	how	the	patient	will	be	able	to	function	in	his	 environment.	 The	GOS	 and	mRS	 are	 simple	 and	 give	 a	 global	 idea	 of	 the	 patient’s	degree	of	disability.	However,	because	of	 their	simplicity,	 they	can	score	patients	with	very	different	abilities	the	same.	For	example,	two	of	the	CMD	patients	both	received	at	discharge	a	GOS	score	of	3,	categorizing	them	as	“severely	disabled”,	but	when	looking	at	the	 other	 outcome	 scales’	 results,	 those	 two	 patients	 seem	 to	 have	 very	 different	functional	outcomes.	 Indeed,	 the	 first	one	 received	a	LCF	score	of	8,	meaning	 that	 the	patient	was	oriented,	able	to	respond	appropriately	to	her	environment	and	to	initiate	and	 carry	 out	 familiar	 routines	 with	 stand-by	 assistance,	 whereas	 the	 second	 one	received	a	LCF	score	of	3,	defined	by	localized	responses	to	sensory	or	noxious	stimuli,	
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inconsistent	 responses	 to	 simple	 commands	 and	 a	 need	 for	 total	 assistance.	 The	 joint	use	 of	 the	 different	 scales	 allows	 therefore	 a	 better	 appreciation	 of	 the	 cognitive	 and	functional	capacities	of	the	patients.	The	 care	 management	 of	 CMD	 patients	 raises	 ethical	 concerns.	 Indeed,	 preserved	cognition	has	been	highlighted	in	those	patients,	but	the	meaning	and	the	extent	of	those	patients’	needs	and	capabilities	are	still	to	be	discovered.	For	example,	the	prevention	of	suffering	is	crucial,	especially	with	such	vulnerable	patients,	as	they	might	not	be	able	to	express	 their	 distress.	 As	 Fins	 and	 al.	 (74)	 stressed,	 when	 faced	 with	 uncertainty,	universal	 pain	 precaution	 should	 be	 the	 norm.	 Furthermore,	 once	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	preserved	 cognition	 is	 highlighted	 in	 patients,	 it	 becomes	 an	 ethical	 duty	 to	 try	 to	restore	communication	(75).	Although	the	use	of	fMRI	successfully	allowed	Monti	and	al.	(11)	 to	 establish	 communication	with	 a	 severely	 brain-injured	 patient,	 Bardin	and	al.	(76)	highlighted	the	challenges	associated	with	 the	reliable	and	consistent	use	of	such	method.	 Notably,	 they	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 ability	 to	 communicate	 couldn’t	necessarily	 be	 translated	with	 fMRI.	 Indeed,	 two	 patients	 enrolled	 in	 their	 study	 had	reliable	behavioural	ability	to	communicate	but	weren’t	able	to	perform	the	fMRI	task.	Characterization	 of	 EEG	 signals	 may	 serve	 as	 another	 potential	 way	 to	 restore	communication.	 In	their	study,	Curley	and	al.	(77)	demonstrated	a	global	physiological	integrity	 with	 a	 preservation	 of	 relatively	 normal	 EEG	 background	 in	 CMD	 patients.	Although	these	EEG	signals	were	subject	to	variations	due	to	arousal	fluctuations,	their	similarity	 to	 those	 in	 healthy	 subjects	 could	 attest	 for	 the	 ability	 to	 communicate	 and	allow	 the	development	and	use	of	brain-computer	 interfaces.	Even	 if	 the	possibility	of	restored	 communication	 with	 CMD	 patients	 hasn’t	 been	 fully	 demonstrated	 yet,	 it	should	 be	 pursued,	 not	 only	 in	 the	 acute	 phase,	 but	 throughout	 the	 recovery,	 as	structural	 and	 functional	 reorganization	 of	 cross-hemispheric	 connections	 and	 brain	areas	associated	with	language	could	occur	over	a	long	period	of	time,	indicating	a	late	recovery	of	communication	(78).	So	 far,	 it	 doesn’t	 exist	 a	 consensus	 on	 how	 to	 detect	 and	 diagnose	 CMD	patients.	 The	CRS-R	 is	 used	 as	 a	 gold	 standard	 to	 assess	 patients	 suffering	 from	 disorders	 of	consciousness,	but	it	still	encounters	a	high	rate	of	misdiagnosis	(47).	The	multiplication	of	CRS-R	assessments	during	the	day	has	been	proposed	in	order	to	minimize	the	risk	of	misclassification	 due	 to	 the	 patients’	 fluctuant	 states	 (79).	 Wannez	 and	 al.	 (80)	suggested	performing	at	 least	5	 assessments	 in	order	 to	obtain	an	accurate	diagnosis.	However,	even	after	exhaustive	behavioural	assessments,	undetected	consciousness	can	still	be	highlighted	using	fMRI,	EEG	command-following	paradigms	or	EEG	responses	to	transcranial	 magnetic	 stimulation	 (30-81-82).	 In	 our	 study,	 we	 investigated	 the	sensitivity	and	specificity	of	 the	prediction	of	consciousness	recovery	according	 to	 the	CRS-R.	It	proved	to	be	more	specific	than	sensitive,	with	a	low	negative	predictive	value.	This	implies	that	the	potential	of	consciousness	recovery	of	certain	CMD	patients	won’t	be	 recognised	by	 the	CRS-R.	For	example,	 one	CMD	patient	was	 considered	having	no	conscious	recovery	according	to	the	CRS-R,	but	her	LCF	score	at	discharge	was	6	(a	score	
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considered	as	a	good	outcome).	This	indicates	that,	although	still	needing	assistance,	she	was	notably	able	to	follow	simple	directions,	was	starting	to	recognise	the	staff,	to	show	emerging	awareness	of	self	and	family,	express	her	discomfort	and	carry	over	relearned	tasks,	which	 clearly	 contradicts	 the	 CRS-R	 consciousness	 recovery	 prediction.	 Overall,	this	 reinforces	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 CRS-R	 used	 alone	 isn’t	 adapted	 to	 consistently	 detect	CMD	patients	and	document	an	“observable	recovery”	of	their	consciousness.	Because	it	is	now	recognised	that	CMD	patients	demonstrate	higher	preserved	cognition	than	DOC	patients,	it	is	essential	to	offer	them	the	right	to	be	acknowledged	as	such	by	using	 reliable	 diagnostic	 methods.	 The	 challenge	 will	 be	 to	 determine	 how	 to	manage/associate	 the	 use	 of	 the	 current	 behavioural	 and	 functional	 diagnostic	 tools	available	(MBT-r,	EEG,	fIRM,	PET)	in	order	to	obtain	a	standardized	accurate	diagnosis.	Once	 recognised,	 CMD	 patients	 will	 be	 able	 to	 consistently	 benefit	 from	 adapted	care/rehabilitation	 to	 enhance	 their	 potential	 of	 improvement.	 Indeed,	 as	 discussed	above,	they	prove	to	have	better	outcomes	than	the	DOC	patients,	with	higher	chances	to	reach	 good	 functional	 recovery.	 This	 will	 also	 be	 achieved	 through	 a	 better	understanding	 of	 the	 underlying	 physiopathology	 of	 such	 condition.	 In	 their	 study,	Forgacs	and	al.	(83)	demonstrated	preserved	cortical	metabolism	and	normal	wake	and	sleep	brain	networks’	physiology	 in	DOC	patients	showing	 fMRI	evidence	of	command	following.	Similar	findings	were	reported	by	Stender	and	al.	(84).	Although	those	studies	give	us	primordial	information,	there	is	still	a	need	for	a	global	physiological	model	that	could	 be	 correlated	 with	 the	 different	 degrees	 of	 preserved	 cognitive	 capacities.	Furthermore,	 recent	 studies	 have	 expressed	 the	 need	 of	 an	 improvement	 of	 the	 DOC	taxonomy.	 Indeed,	 Bayne	and	al.	 (85)	 pointed	 that	 the	 current	DOC	 taxonomy	 is	 only	based	 on	 behavioural	 criteria,	 therefore	 not	 accounting	 for	 the	 underlying	 conscious	capacities	not	expressed	behaviourally.	One	of	their	propositions	of	improvement	would	be	 to	 revise	 the	 diagnostic	 criteria,	 by	 complementing	 them	with	 brain-based	 criteria	(based	 on	 EEG	 and	 functional	 neuroimaging).	 Similar	 concerns	 were	 addressed	 by	Naccache	 (4),	who	proposed	a	new	classification	based	on	behavioural	 and	 functional	neuroimaging	 data.	 Further	 work	 will	 be	 needed	 to	 reach	 a	 consensus	 on	 how	 to	improve/reform	DOC	taxonomy.	
Limitations	In	our	 study,	we	 compared	 the	different	outcomes	of	CMD	patients	with	 the	DOC	and	NON-DOC	ones.	Because	we	performed	univariate	analysis,	we	didn’t	take	into	account	the	different	factors	that	may	have	played	a	role	in	the	patients’	outcomes.	For	example,	Cruse	and	al.	 (86)	 identified	 that	 covert	 consciousness	was	more	 likely	 to	be	 found	 in	patients	 suffering	 from	 a	 traumatic	 brain	 injury	 than	 a	 non-traumatic	 one.	 As	 the	aetiology	 of	 the	 brain	 injury	 can	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 diagnosis,	 it	 could	 as	 well	influence	the	outcome,	independently	from	the	diagnosis.	Further	multivariate	analyses	are	currently	ongoing	in	the	Acute	Neurorehabilitation	Unit	(CHUV,	Lausanne)	and	the	results	will	be	the	subject	of	a	following	paper.	
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Many	other	confounding	factors,	such	as	demographic	information	(gender,	age,	etc.)	or	localisation/extent	 of	 the	 brain	 injury,	 could	 possibly	 have	 brought	 a	 bias	 into	 the	results.	We	enrolled	patients	that	were	transferred	into	the	NRA	unit,	meaning	that	they	were	already	considered	as	having	a	certain	potential	of	rehabilitation,	which	could	have	induce	a	bias	of	selection.	The	results	should	also	be	taken	with	caution,	as	the	number	of	 participants	 in	 the	 DOC	 category	 (n=19)	 and	 the	 NON-DOC	 category	 (n=17)	 was	relatively	low.	Another	potential	source	of	bias	lies	in	the	outcome	scales.	Indeed,	their	scoring	results	from	the	appreciation	and	interpretation	of	the	operator,	which	can	be	subject	to	some	variability.		Therefore,	further	multivariate	and	multicentre	studies	should	be	conducted	in	order	to	confirm	these	results.		
CONCLUSION	Our	study	shows	that	the	patients	suffering	from	CMD	present	overall	better	functional	outcomes	than	the	ones	with	DOC.	The	CMD	patients	also	prove	to	be	very	similar	to	the	NON-DOC	 patients	 in	 terms	 of	 potential	 of	 improvement	 and	 functional	 outcomes	 at	discharge.		The	ERBI,	DRS	and	LCF	demonstrated	to	be	sensitive	enough	to	already	distinguish	the	three	groups	of	patients	at	admission.	They	should	be	used	at	admission,	discharge	and	throughout	 the	 recovery	 in	 order	 to	 track	 the	patients’	 progress.	 Indeed,	 the	 fact	 that	they	 investigate	 the	 daily	 activities,	 neuropsychological	 aspects	 and	 cognitive	 abilities	independently	from	motor	functions	seems	to	allow	them	to	better	assess	the	cognitive	and	 functional	 capacities	 of	 the	patients.	 The	GOS	 and	mRS	 are	 interesting	 in	 the	 fact	that	they	give	a	global	idea	of	the	patients’	disability	but	because	of	their	simplicity,	they	often	classify	patients	with	very	different	functional	outcomes	in	the	same	category.	The	CRS-R,	 by	 not	 taking	 into	 account	 motor	 limitations	 or	 neuropsychological	 aspects,	proves	to	lack	sensitivity	in	detecting	consciousness	recovery.		Finally,	our	findings	highlight	the	fact	that	CMD	patients	constitute	a	separate	category	of	patients	with	better	potential	of	improvement	and	functional	outcomes	than	the	DOC	patients,	reinforcing	the	need	for	them	to	be	recognised	as	soon	as	possible,	as	it	could	have	a	direct	impact	on	patient	care	and	influence	life	and	death	decisions.				
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